In Afghanistan attack, CIA fell victim to miscalculations about informant

Washington Post

AMMAN, Jordan — He was an ambitious young doctor from a large family who had a foreign wife and two children — details that officers of Jordan’s intelligence service viewed as exploitable vulnerabilities, not biography.

Early last year, the General Intelligence Department picked up Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al- Balawi after his pseudonymous postings on extremist Web sites had become increasingly strident. During three days of questioning, GID officers threatened to have al-Balawi jailed and end his medical career and hinted they could cause problems for his family, according to a former U.S. official and a Jordanian official, both of whom have knowledge of al- Balawi’s detention.

Al-Balawi was told that if he traveled to Pakistan and infiltrated radical groups there, his slate would be wiped clean and his family left alone, said the former U.S. official, whose more-detailed account of the GID’s handling of al-Balawi was generally corroborated by the Jordanian, as well as by two former Jordanian intelligence officers.

Al-Balawi agreed, and as the relationship developed, GID officers began to think that he indeed was willing to work against al-Qaida.

This belief was the first in a series of miscalculations that culminated Dec. 30 when al-Balawi stepped out of a car at a CIA facility in Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan. CIA officers allowed al-Balawi, who was wearing a vest packed with explosives and metal, to enter the base without a search. Then he detonated his load, killing seven CIA officers and contractors, a Jordanian intelligence officer and al-Balawi’s driver.

Jordanian and U.S. officials have since concluded that al-Balawi was a committed extremist whose beliefs had deep intellectual and religious roots and who had never intended to cooperate with them. In hindsight, they said, the excitement generated by his ability to produce verifiable intelligence should have been tempered by the recognition that his penetration of al-Qaida’s top echelon was too rapid to be true.

Senior CIA and GID officials were so beguiled by the prospect of a strike against al-Qaida’s inner sanctum that they discounted concerns raised by case officers in both services that al-Balawi might be a fraud, according to the former U.S. official and a Jordanian government official with an intelligence background.

But a U.S. intelligence official, speaking on the customary condition of anonymity, rejected assertions that the CIA had abandoned caution. “No one — not in Washington, not in the field — let excitement or anticipation run the show,” the official said. The GID’s approach was more subtle than simple blackmail, he added. “Persuasion works better than coercion, and that’s something the Jordanians understand completely,” the official said.