Despite delays, war in Iraq is just

By E. THOMAS McCLANAHAN
KANSAS CITY STAR
Three years after the invasion of Iraq, the most grating aspect of the debate over this war remains the annoying certainty with which all the second-guessing takes place.
Heaven knows, the operation unfolded with many embedded flaws, the biggest of which was excessive optimism regarding how quickly a stable government could be established.
But there wasn't much about any of this that would have been easy, beginning with the basic choice that President Bush faced. Even if he had left Saddam Hussein in place, the future would have been messy and ominous. It bears repeating: We're better off today with Saddam Hussein out of power.
What if we hadn't invaded?
Consider for a moment what would result had Bush lost his nerve.
With Hussein still in power, our pilots would still be patrolling the no-fly zones. Iraqis would still be massacred in significant numbers and buried in mass graves. The doubts about Hussein's weapons, his intentions and his probable links with terrorist groups would remain.
For alternative history fans, here's something else to ponder: With Hussein still in power, many Democrats who favored "regime change" in Iraq during the Clinton years would see an opportunity to burnish their national-security credentials. It's not hard to imagine them attacking Bush for failing to deal with Iraq, while presenting themselves as more willing to defend the country from the threat posed by Hussein's weapons.
With Hussein still in power, his presumed arsenal would remain a concern. Only a few weeks before the invasion, Hussein's own generals were unaware the Iraqi dictator had already disposed of his WMDs. They were stunned when told the weapons did not exist.
That gem popped up last week in a book excerpt adapted for publication in The New York Times. The book is "Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq," by Times correspondent Michael R. Gordon and retired Marine Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor.
If Hussein's own generals believed he had illegal weapons, the CIA -- and the intelligence agencies of many other nations -- were entitled to believe it as well. Strange, but last week I didn't hear any apologies from the "Bush lied" folks.
More second-guessing
One of the "Cobra II" excerpts focused on disputes among the top brass during the drive to Baghdad, and this account set off another round of second-guessing.
"Cobra II" tells how the top U.S. commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, failed to listen to his own generals, who urged him to slow his drive to the Iraqi capital. With a slower advance, they could mop up more of the irregular Fedayeen, whose unexpected attacks presaged the coming insurgency.
But Franks was portrayed as stubbornly insistent. The Fedayeen were mere "speed bumps." He had promised Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that Baghdad would fall in a matter of weeks, and he told his generals to press on, even though the Fedayeen were attacking coalition supply lines.
Certainly we had too few troops for the mayhem that came later, for which Rumsfeld and Franks must share the blame. But in the game of second-guessing wars, a bit of humility is in order. There are many choices with unappealing consequences. One small twist, and the whole kaleidoscope changes, not just one part of the image.
"Cobra II," for example, reveals Hussein's reluctance to allow his generals to blow up a key bridge over the Euphrates River. Hussein dithered, then finally agreed, but too late. The span was captured mostly intact. American forces surged across the river. Baghdad fell sooner than expected.
If Franks had tarried longer in the south to kill more Fedayeen, perhaps the insurgency would have been less damaging. But the Euphrates bridge may not have been available. The fight for Baghdad might have been prolonged and bloody.
Delaying the drive to Baghdad would also have diminished the shock value resulting from the sudden demise of Hussein's regime. That his fall came with such spectacular speed was a strategic coup, an event that caused many in the Arab world to realize that the old pattern of Middle East authoritarianism had reached a dead end.
I plead guilty to being among those who have been overly optimistic about Iraq, but I continue to believe success -- defined as the establishment of a reasonably stable, self-governing Iraqi state -- is not only attainable but imperative.
Those who predicted that bringing order to Iraq would be much harder than expected have been proved right.
Unfortunately, many of them seem to assume that this is proof that it wasn't worth doing in the first place.
E. Thomas McClanahan is a member of the Kansas City Star editorial board. Distributed by Knight Ridder/Tribune Information Services.