High-tech gadgets have their limits

WASHINGTON -- Once again it looks like the CIA's reliance on electronic gadgetry has done far more harm than good. Just the fact that a number of women and children were killed in an effort to take out Al-Qaida's second-in-command is enough to negate any gains even if the exercise had been successful.
Someone in the agency had to know that firing missiles from an unmanned drone into a village was more than likely to bring collateral damage that would stir up a new hornet's nest of protest in an area where the image of a brutal, uncaring America is becoming increasingly cemented in the minds of many, even those who also have suffered from Muslim radicalism. From that aspect alone, the mission had failure written all over it.
If, as has been reported, the CIA had Ayman al-Zawahiri in its sights for several days waiting for the proper time to nail him with firepower from the Predator drone, then why did it miss? The answer seems simple enough. The actual on-the-ground tracking of his movements was faulty or non-existent, a condition that has plagued U.S. intelligence since the days when a misguided Sen. Frank Church, hoping to boost his presidential aspirations, nearly ruined the agency's effectiveness by emasculating its covert operations.
This, of course, leads one to ask: Whatever happened to the old commando concept of doing business? Despite not knowing all the facts of the "classified" debacle and the political requirements imposed by the Pakistan government, it would be reasonable to assume that a quick strike force could have hit the village hideout of al-Zawahiri far more surgically and effectively than an indiscriminate missile that takes out everything and everyone but the right person. Obviously some militants went down in the raid and that is a plus, but it is hardly enough to offset the damage done by the death of children.
This should not be read as a bleeding-heart defense of the murderous thugs and fanatics along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Al-Zawahiri is an important cog in the terrorist machine that needs to be eliminated and that often requires measures that strain the national dedication to civilized warfare, if there is such a thing. Collateral damage is a fact of life in these matters, but one looks for ways to lessen its scope. With that objective, the launching of missiles into village compounds is not a prudent way to proceed.
On-ground intelligence
Every investigation of the activities leading up to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has emphasized the need for the improvement of on-ground intelligence by the CIA. That requires rebuilding the vast foreign, in-country networks that the agency began dismantling during the 1970s in favor of spy satellites, which were supposed to be more efficient. The real reason, of course, was the political dust kicked up in a series of sensational revelations in committee hearings led by Church about Cold War CIA operations, including assassination plots. But the satellites proved highly inefficient when it came to finding hostages and receiving information in advance of anti-U.S. projects, especially in the Middle East.
The CIA has developed the kind of commando teams that the British know how to operate better than anyone else. There also are Delta Force and other special-ops teams available from the U.S. Army. Why not use one of them? During World War II, Robert S. Allen, a key U.S. Army officer assigned as chief of intelligence for Gen. George Patton, was blown out of his jeep and captured by the Germans. His identity was initially unknown and he was taken to a German hospital, where his shattered arm was amputated. The Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner to the CIA, knew instantly where he was located from its network of informants. If the Germans identified him, he would have been tortured for his vast knowledge of U.S. plans.
For two days, U.S. planes skip-bombed on either side of the hospital. On the third day a group of British commandos went in under the most perilous circumstances and rescued him. There are lessons to be learned from this. All the James Bond gadgetry in the world, including drones, frequently can't match the effectiveness of human endeavor. Certainly there is risk of failure and the potential loss of American lives in such an operation. But it is far more acceptable than what occurred, which actually is little better than the bombs launched by terrorists on innocent populations.
X Dan K. Thomasson is former editor of the Scripps Howard.