Intelligent design lacking in Iraq war

WASHINGTON -- The nation's capital is filled with perfervid discussion these days over the relative truths of our universe's "evolution" vs. its possible "intelligent design." Was it all an evolutionary accident, in which man gradually arose out of the muck, or did God's hand create the intricacies of the human form and spirit today?
I cannot help but notice, as the conservative position has moved from strict creationism to intelligent design, that the biblical idea of the seven days of God's creation, though still widely held, has retreated to the curtains of the drama.
But today, let's speak of a different form of evolution that also haunts our thoughts, our newspapers and our future: the evolution of the ideas about the Iraq war and how it would/could/should possibly end.
We know by now that there was precious little "intelligent design" at work in our occupation of Iraq, although the original military attacks were spectacularly accomplished. Our policy moved from 1) believing that the Iraqis would welcome us as liberators and immediately adopt democracy, despite their bitter history, to 2) amazement, finally bordering on despair, over the internal breakup of the country, to 3) the U.S. military command's lowering of expectations for what can be accomplished in that strange and hostile land, to 4) the genuine, if perhaps impossible, creation of an elected and constitutional government that would give "cover" to American withdrawal and leave some mutant form of united Iraq behind, no matter what it might choose to do in the future.
Policy expectations
Now we have had the referendum on the constitution At this writing, it appears that it passed, and with some enthusiasm, although not so much as during the presidential elections of last spring. And once again, we find that policy expectations are evolving. The newest line of questioning, from essential moderates who want the whole thing to work, is whether even a constitutional government can defeat a well-funded and well-manned insurgency.
Reports from senior officials inside the administration say that intelligence over the last few months indicates that, even with democratic institutions, the insurgency may strengthen. The constitution could turn out to be, some are saying, a factor for division rather than unity, because it effectively legitimizes the separateness of the three sections of the country: Sunni, Shia and Kurd.
Kenneth Pollack, former CIA analyst and now at the Saban Center at The Brooking Institution, who originally took a reasonably supportive position vis-a-vis the war, now says, "The theory that democracy is the antidote to insurgency gets disproved on the ground every day."
This may, of course, be too harsh. Credit is due to the Americans and Iraqis who genuinely have tried to create these institutional structures in Iraq. CNN's retired Maj. Gen. Don Shepperd, an early critic, just came back from Iraq, for the first time praising Iraqi forces for their evolution. It is not a question of whether there are good people in Iraq, whether we are encouraging them or whether intentions are good.
Fractious democracy
The problem here, rather, is that fractious democracy, which is what Iraq, at the very best, will have in spades -- and with that kind of democracy's inability to assert its power against insurgents who have absolute belief in the "truth" of their faith and their fight -- cannot summon will and power. Democracy must empower and protect average Iraqis enough so that they will ultimately side with the government in sufficient numbers to gradually deprive the insurgents of their violent faithful and their fanatically suicidal.
We have a number of case studies in history that give us substantial insight into how capable leaderships have been able to defeat insurgencies and create progressive governments. Lee Kuan Yew did it in Singapore; a former communist himself, he first fought the communists to a standstill, then made his city-state into a model for the world. Sultan Qaboos did it in Oman; he took over a dismally backward state, fought off a communist rebellion in Dhofar and made Oman into a little paradise.
In contrast to Iraq, in every case, there was a strong and respected authority at the center during the time it took to splice the country back together -- or just together -- and to isolate, destroy or exile the insurgents.
Universal Press Syndicate