Taiwan war scenario myths abound

By MONTE R. BULLARD
GLOBAL BEAT SYNDICATE
GULF BREEZE, Fla. -- In mid-February, CIA Director Porter Goss said that "Beijing's military modernization and military buildup is tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait." That statement is accurate but misleading: Was he talking about a balance between China and Taiwan alone or China and Taiwan with U.S. support? In neither case is the current power balanced.
Without our support, China already has a preponderance of power over Taiwan. And we have far more military capability than China, but it is generally agreed that U.S. forces could inflict destruction and prevent an invasion of Taiwan, but could not invade and occupy China.
It is the job of military planners to assume that China will use force, but the real issue involves China's politics, not military capability.
Reunification is written into China's 1982 constitution, and maintaining national sovereignty is considered a sacred mission by the People's Liberation Army's leaders. So, while many analysts say Beijing would not use force because of rapidly developing economic interdependence with Taiwan, or because of possible global political and economic repercussions, they miss a key point. China is not a monolith and top Chinese leaders who understand the economic and political value of avoiding conflict may not have the last word on this critical topic.
Many analysts assume that "use of force" would include some form of invasion by mainland troops -- an assumption that appears in nearly all scenarios. This assumption has been a key factor in the decision to sell U.S. arms to Taiwan and in contingency planning about when and how the United States might come to Taiwan's aid. Two weaknesses in this assumption cause faulty analyses: one involves China's principal goal for the use of force and the other involves the likelihood of various strategic scenarios.
Wrong assumptions
The first wrong assumption is that the PLA would attack Taiwan to occupy or punish it for moving too far toward independence. More likely, Chinese military leaders would use military means to force Taiwan to the conference table for negotiations, not to occupy it. That would allow China to take the moral high ground from the beginning, stating that all it wants is for Taiwan to negotiate over its future degree of autonomy. Such a goal would mitigate adverse world opinion. Having the goal of forcing Taiwan into negotiations, instead of invading Taiwan to occupy it, makes a huge difference in the types of military strategies involved and the kind of support required.
A goal of forcing Taiwan to the negotiations table means China can use an incremental strategy. It would not begin with a "surprise-decapitation" attack, but with gradually escalating warnings. China's target audiences would not only be Taiwan's leaders, military and population, but world's leaders and global opinion as well. China has already shown that it can influence opinions effectively in other countries.
Some experts think Taiwan could protect itself by hardening its military facilities, improving its air or anti-submarine defense capability or maintaining air superiority across the Strait. All this focuses on unlikely invasion scenarios. PLA strategic plans for defeating Taiwan are far more sophisticated than simplistic invasion scenarios. While the PLA does practice combined-force amphibious invasion exercises, it plans to rely on information warfare and political, economic and military pressures to cause Taiwan to negotiate.
PLA leaders know they can cause severe problems for Taiwan without attacking. Just announcing a potential attack would cause Taiwan's stock market to plummet, plus a flight of capital -- as happened after the 1995-96 missile tests. They believe that missile firings offshore plus an effective propaganda campaign and diplomatic/economic manipulation around the world could force Taiwan's leaders to the negotiations table. In their view, an amphibious invasion or even an extensive bombing attack is not necessary.
In sum, there is no balance of power now across the Taiwan Strait; China will not eschew the use of force but will not attack to conquer and occupy Taiwan. Nor will China necessarily be labeled by world opinion as the aggressor if there is a military confrontation. U.S. planners must prepare for this type of warfare. And our response should be political and economic, not simply increased arms sales to Taiwan.
X Monte L. Bullard served as U.S. Army attache to China and as liaison to Taiwan's military. This article was written for Global Beat Syndicate.