HOW HE SEES IT U.S. errs in policy on reform for Syria

By ROBERT BELCHER
GLOBAL BEAT SYNDICATE
RICHMOND, Va. -- The Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act that just became law marks the latest U.S. misstep in the Middle East. Pushed by Congress and endorsed by President Bush, the law will not hasten the administration's stated goal of bringing democracy to the region, but instead will delay it by pushing reform-minded Syrians toward the current regime.
The Bush administration plan to level sanctions on Syria makes clear that Bush has not abandoned his efforts to remake the region. Our policy-makers see in Syria what they saw in Iraq: a regime that brutalizes its own people, possesses weapons of mass destruction, occupies a neighboring country and threatens global order by supporting terrorism. But by viewing Syria through Iraqi-tinted lenses, we not only pursue a partly erroneous and bankrupt policy but fundamentally misconstrue the Syrian political scene.
Iraq comparison
The room for political maneuvering in Syria, though severely circumscribed, has long been larger than in Iraq. In the areas under Saddam Hussein's control, political opposition was moribund, although Islamist groups maintained a weak presence. In Syria, by contrast, opposition parties have remained a staple of the political scene. Syria's Bath Party rules in conjunction with seven others in the National Progressive Front (NPF). Opposition parties have little independence, but the NPF coalition itself creates inherent tensions that can be exploited; the Bathists have never been able to ignore the NPF's demands completely.
Moreover, "illegal" parties have long been active in Syria. Even after Hafiz al-Asad decimated the Islamist movement in the 1980s, smaller-scale organizing continued. Disaffected Kurds, Palestinians and Islamists coalesced around local issues to challenge to the regime.
The regime's response was harsh, but its victories were never absolute. In fact, the disturbances that recently rocked several Syrian cities would never have spread so widely had the political base not been prepared by 11 illegal Kurdish parties.
A new social solidarity
Even before Bush's Middle East reform policies, social and intellectual ferment in Syria was growing, reaching new heights after Hafez al-Asad's death, when hopes for true political and economic reform were widespread. The "Damascus Spring" withered on the vine, but a new social solidarity took root then, especially among intellectuals in major cities.
Today, political forums are watched by informers, but dissidents still meet informally. A decade-old wave of conspicuous consumption has produced many new cafes, restaurants and other venues where elites share their discontent. Nor is dissent restricted to the wealthy: complaints about the economy and government corruption are commonplace on satellite television and even in state-run newspapers.
Another hopeful sign is that reform itself is now subject to debate in Syria. Older voices are being challenged by a new generation. As one "twenty-something" said after attending a political forum, "The older generation, they just want to hear themselves talk. They are only out to promote their own reputations. It's the younger folks who have the most interesting things to say. One got up and attacked Riyad al-Turk (Syria's leading dissident). It was the best thing that happened at the meeting."
Informal social networks, rising expectations, and the rapid dissemination of information have conferred a new, if still inchoate, sense of empowerment. This gradual aggravation of domestic tensions dividing the regime from various social groups offers the best chance for reform. The process might not happen as quickly as the proponents of democracy and justice wish, and it might produce a government unlikely to do our bidding. But it offers the best possibility for authentic reform that speaks to the needs and desires of the Syrian people.
While many Syrians want to see a representative government replace Bath rule, they support their regime's foreign policy. Thus, our new Syrian Accountability Act will narrow the gap between the regime and the people, not exacerbate it.
The Bush administration's heavy-handed approach will compromise and alienate the very groups it should be courting. Already it has raised Syrian suspicions that "reform" is simply a code word for the installation of a compliant, not democratic, regime.
Toppling Bashar al-Asad is a recipe for plunging Syria into the same instability and enmity in Iraq today.
X Robert Blecher is assistant professor of history at the University of Richmond, where he teaches Middle East history. Distributed by Knight Ridder/Tribune Information Services