HOW HE SEES IT Conclusions of Sept. 11 commission are stunningly obvious

By JOHN C. BERSIA
ORLANDO SENTINEL
The latest conclusions from the 9/11 commission -- that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden never developed a cozy relationship and that the United States essentially was unprepared for the 2001 attacks -- strike me as stunning in only one way: their obviousness.
Saddam and bin Laden were destined, by the very nature of the transnational, revolutionary, ideological forces driving their respective camps, to clash. Even at times when the idea of teaming up against a common enemy such as the United States may have tempted them, it was unlikely that any long-term, meaningful, trusting, cooperative bond would have emerged.
Saddam had set his sights on leading the Arab world, inspired partly by his Baath party's vision of cultural unity and partly by his ego -- a path that led to invading Kuwait in 1990. Some analysts have argued that Saddam, after failing to anticipate the overwhelmingly negative global response to Kuwait's subjugation, accepted and even relished the impending battle with the U.S.-led coalition -- despite the prospect of certain defeat.
Perhaps Saddam hoped to follow in the footsteps of one of his heroes, former President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who elevated his own stature in the Arab world by confronting Israel. Even in the advent of defeat, Saddam stood a chance of reaching mythical status among the frustrated and dispossessed of the region. Indeed, despite the war's disastrous results for Iraq, Saddam's star steadily rose during the 1990s, as he continued to defy the United States and its allies.
Thus, Saddam had no need for a strategic alliance with Al-Qaida or any other organization that might seriously have competed for influence. It is no secret that bin Laden and his cohorts aspire to extend their control over the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Europe and Central Asia. That result would represent merely the beginning of Al-Qaida's insidious plot to undermine the concept of civilization that most people embrace.
What Saddam knew
Saddam also knew that bin Laden despised everything about him. He probably had about as much faith in Al-Qaida's overtures as European countries had recently when they rejected bin Laden's purported proposal of a trade -- a moratorium on attacks in Europe if the nations of that region would withdraw from their military operations in the Middle East.
At the same time, it makes sense that Saddam's minions would have interacted with their Al-Qaida counterparts. Saddam's regime maintained contact with a number of terrorist groups -- and provided assistance and safe haven to some of them -- to advance his broad objective of disrupting adversaries.
It's worth noting, too, that various officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have pointed to Saddam's own terrorist ambitions, which included potential U.S. targets.
Of course, Al-Qaida succeeded in harming the United States in ways that Saddam had only imagined. Consequently, the group's attractiveness increased to some of the same frustrated and dispossessed people that Saddam once courted.
Before the 2003 U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, Al-Qaida saw the value and seized the opportunity of dispatching operatives to Iraq. More joined them in the confusion of the conflict and its aftermath, and Iraq quickly evolved into a center in the war against terrorism -- a position that it did not previously hold.
That development, combined with the fierce resistance of Saddam loyalists and others opposed to the intervention, has confounded U.S. officials. And they struggle for new strategies to deal with the rapidly changing realities, just as they did Sept. 11.
Reasons for uncertainty
That the nation's leaders appeared to operate in a fog after the 9/11 attacks stemmed as much from the lack of historical preparedness against terrorism as it did from shock, confusion, poor communication and uneven coordination. Similar disarray would have prevailed if Al-Qaida had conducted its attacks in 2000, which bin Laden reportedly urged at one stage.
From the beginning of the current wave of global terrorism, which dates from the 1970s, one U.S. president after another failed to mount a coordinated, sustained, hard-hitting, global campaign of diplomatic, economic, clandestine and military initiatives against terrorists.
Admittedly, such a campaign would have encountered extraordinary difficulties in the early days of terrorism's resurgence. But as time progressed and the face of the enemy became clearer -- especially after the end of the Cold War -- the absence of stronger, comprehensive action against terrorism defied reason.
Those who believe that the Bush administration has exaggerated the war against terrorism delude themselves. The threat is frighteningly and dangerously real, from the battlegrounds of Iraq to the streets of America.
XJohn C. Bersia, who won a Pulitzer Prize in editorial writing for the Orlando Sentinel in 2000, is also the special assistant to the president for global perspectives and a professor at the University of Central Florida. Distributed by Knight Ridder/Tribune Information Services.