Panel reveals opportunities to hinder plot

The comission uncovered 'points of vulnerability' in Al-Qaida's attack plan.
COMBINED DISPATCHES
WASHINGTON -- The 9/11 commission's report does not fix blame for how the worst terror attack in U.S. history was able to take place. But the nearly 600 pages of conclusions -- after more than 1,300 interviews and the review of 2 million documents -- are full of shoulda-woulda-couldas detailing moments when the attacks might have been thrown off or reduced in scale, if not fully prevented.
The details range from events where better follow-through could have made a difference -- such as a crucial meeting of Al-Qaida operatives in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 -- to disregarded FBI field reports and even lax security checks of the hijackers on Sept. 11. In all, they're both heartbreaking and instructive.
While the "could this have been prevented?" debate may never be concluded, the commission's findings on what went wrong in specific instances are thus signposts for the future -- even in instances where the conclusion is that a different response would not have guaranteed a foiling of the attacks.
For example, Al-Qaida's Kuala Lumpur meeting, already given substantial attention in part because of the presence of two hijackers -- Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar -- gets fresh emphasis as a lost opportunity. The CIA loses track of them and they are never watch-listed, even though the CIA knows Hazmi holds a U.S. visa. Still, the panel concludes that "even if watchlisting had prevented or alerted U.S. officials to the entry of Hazmi and Mihdhar, we do not think it is likely that would by itself have prevented the 9/11 attacks."
Opportunities to disrupt
In its executive summary, the commission points to nine "operational opportunities" that it says constituted "points of vulnerability in the plot and opportunities to disrupt it."
In addition to the failure to watch-list Hazmi and Mihdhar, they include not detecting false passports, not expanding no-fly lists to include names from terrorist watch lists, and not searching airline passengers identified on existing screening systems.
More broadly, the commission's report -- the third major report on terrorism against the U.S. in four years -- raises the question of whether this time a report will be heeded more seriously. The other reports were released before Sept. 11. The conclusion among terrorism experts and policymakers is that the shock of that day means the new report will carry more weight.
Rep. Jane Harman, D-Calif., served on the National Commission on Terrorism in 2000 -- whose final report concluded notably that Americans should expect a major terrorist attack soon on U.S. soil. She recalls her frustration as late as Sept. 10, 2001, that the terror threat was not being paid more attention.
Praise for families
Meanwhile, members of the commission and members of Congress praised the families of Sept. 11 victims Thursday for forcing the independent commission inquiry, overcoming initial resistance from the White House.
"We were told two years ago that there would never be a commission," said Steve Push, whose 42-year-old wife Lisa Raines died on the plane that struck the Pentagon on Sept. 11. Push quit his job at a Maryland biotech company to become a full-time advocate for accountability from those charged with guarding against such attacks.
After the commission was formed, the families won victories to provide more funding and more time for the panel to do its work. Push testified at the outset, urging commissioners to name names.
Thursday's final report, recommending major changes in how Congress and the White House oversee intelligence agencies, signaled a new phase in the families' struggle to recraft the U.S. intelligence apparatus.
Push, who has since remarried, predicted a tougher fight ahead convincing Congress and the intelligence agencies to go along with the panel's recommendations.
"It's going to be a very difficult struggle," he said. "These forces will try to prevent these changes from taking place."
The families, he said, would only be successful if they convince the public the changes are necessary.
A call to action
All of the roughly 30 Sept. 11 family members who attended the hearing saw the report as a call to action.
"The families know that this is an election year. We're going to hold these people's feet to the fire," said Debra Burlingame, whose brother Charles was the pilot on the hijacked plane that struck the Pentagon.
Commission Chairman Thomas Kean, in a private meeting with the families, asked them to continue to help by pressuring those in government to adopt the recommended changes.
Family members said they were eager to take up the cause, even if the report's findings offered a dismal assessment of repeated failures leading up to the 2001 attacks.
"I had a lot of my questions answered," said Terry McGovern, whose mother, Anne, was killed at the World Trade Center.
"They weren't answered in a good way, but I think it's really useful to show what kind of job needs to be done," McGovern said. "The report shows there was a catastrophic failure that day, and had the hijackers wanted to take 20 planes that day they could have."
April Gallop said the panel did not have enough time or money to address all of her concerns, but she was pleased by how much they did get done.
"I came here pessimistic, but I leave here optimistic," said Gallop, a 33-year-old who, along with her infant son, was injured in the attack on the Pentagon.