Truth and consequences
Washington Post: The Chinese government recently suggested that it does not necessarily believe U.S. intelligence reports on North Korea's secret effort to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. "We have no knowledge of [North Korea's] nuclear program or its capabilities. We do not know if [North Korea] has a HEU [highly enriched uranium] program," a Chinese Embassy spokesman told The Post last week. In Britain and France hostile commentators have questioned whether there is any legitimate basis for U.S. requests that certain commercial flights to the United States be canceled because of intelligence about possible terrorist attacks. Maybe these objections were politically motivated and would have been raised regardless of the circumstances. But the painful fact is that they carry more weight because of the mounting evidence that U.S. intelligence about Iraq was mistaken -- and because of the Bush administration's refusal to acknowledge it.
An extensive article in The Post last week by reporter Barton Gellman added substantially to the emerging picture of an Iraqi regime that retained the motive and some of the means to acquire or develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons -- but, for the most part, had not done so.
Violations and potential threats
The new evidence bolsters the case that Saddam Hussein blatantly violated the U.N. resolution offering him a "final opportunity" to come clean. Like the interim report of the Bush administration's Iraq Survey Group, it indicates that had the United States not insisted on action against Iraq beginning in 2002, Iraq would have developed illegal weapons it could have used against the United States and its allies -- and that the programs would have resumed after last year's inspections ran their course. But the latest Post report strongly supports a conclusion that much of the case against Iraq made by President Bush and his top aides before the war was wrong.
There is no reason to believe that the president fabricated the case against Iraq. There's little question that the president and other senior officials -- notably Vice President Dick Cheney -- exaggerated the case in public.
The deeper concern is that U.S. intelligence agencies could have been as wrong as they apparently were about a target as important as Iraq.
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