DAN K. THOMASSON The buck should stop with Bush

WASHINGTON -- It should be clear by now to every conscious human being above the age of toddler that estimates of Saddam Hussein's nuclear and biological capabilities were massively incorrect. It should be equally evident that the reason for this was a systemic intelligence failure that stretched over several presidential administrations including the last two.
If there was any lingering doubt, it was dispelled by David Kay's testimony before Congress that "we were almost all wrong" about those weapons of mass destruction that were the cornerstone of justification for overthrowing the Saddam regime. Kay made the statement after resigning as the government's chief weapons inspector. His frank concession has paved the way for appointment of a national commission to find out how this could have happened.
Wonderful. What this country needs is another investigation to determine the obvious, particularly during an election year when the entire affair already has been politicized to a degree that taints almost any conclusion other than a frank admission that someone messed up badly.
To put an end to this, the president of the United States, George W. Bush, needs to make that concession and take responsibility under the Truman Doctrine, not the one about foreign policy but the one that says "the buck stops here." Not only would that be a refreshing change, it would do nothing to alter the fact that Saddam, WMD or not, was a recurring nightmare in the Middle East and his capture and departure ultimately will be hailed as a noble accomplishment.
Realization
The president should realize that Americans are smart enough to understand that despots must ultimately be dealt with in a world where oceans no longer isolate us from personal harm. Certainly 9/11 made that clear. There certainly is evidence that getting rid of Saddam was high on the Bush foreign policy agenda from the outset and that almost anything that would bolster that aim was welcomed.
This does not mean that the president and his advisers influenced what the CIA concluded. To the contrary, there is every indication that the CIA was consistent in its assessments over a long period of time. Bill Clinton, for instance, based his military actions against Iraq on the same intelligence misinformation. What it does indicate is that this White House was more vulnerable to those conclusions, which, we now understand, were mainly incorrect, and in some critical areas overlooked warning signs.
The Congress has been looking into the whys of such a massive failure for months and hopefully any new commission also would center its inquiry on that issue.
What seems apparent to longtime observers of the CIA is that the systemic failures stem from an overreliance on technology that came about in the purge atmosphere of the 1970s when sensational revelations about the so-called "rogue institution" almost destroyed the agency's clandestine services.
During the administration of Jimmy Carter, newly appointed CIA director Stansfield Turner severely restricted the special operations activities, firing some of the agency's top talent.
As a result, any hope of developing sources on the ground that could penetrate the close tribal associations and family loyalties of the Middle East disappeared, leaving the analysts mainly dependent on satellite images and electronic intercepts that can be misleading.
The CIA couldn't even locate Americans held hostage in Lebanon during the Reagan administration.
Pesticides and beer
Bruce Berkowitz, an intelligence expert from the Hoover Institution, noted in a recent article that the equipment for making biological weapons is nearly identical to that for making pesticides and beer and that the really essential components are the knowledge inside the weapons makers' heads. Satellites can't obtain that information and there is an indication that the responsible scientists were even misleading Saddam.
Berkowitz and others believe that Saddam did have programs for developing biological, chemical and nuclear weapons after 1998, but had them on hold until sanctions against Iraq ultimately were lifted. But, Berkowitz wrote, Saddam was so intent on maintaining his power and international standing he never could let inspectors discover that his programs had been shelved, sealing his own fate.
Perhaps it is too much to ask a president who is facing a tough re-election campaign to concede that he, as Kay said, was wrong about the imminent threat to the United States and others of chemical or biological attacks from Iraq.
XDan K. Thomasson is former editor of the Scripps Howard News Service.)