Unrest divides U.S., allies

President Bush welcomes Prime Minister Tony Blair to Washington today.
COMBINED DISPATCHES
Two weeks of kidnapping, mayhem and carnage in Iraq, which has provoked a muscular U.S. military response, has also drawn a deeper divide in U.S.-European relations. Even with America's chief ally, Britain.
As Prime Minister Tony Blair arrives in Washington today for his first t & ecirc;te- & agrave;-t & ecirc;te with President Bush in five months, experts say that clear differences on peacekeeping and nation-building are likely to be expressed.
The slaughter of an Italian hostage Wednesday -- the first known murder of dozens of foreigners thought to be kidnapped in the country -- serves as a brutal reminder of the pressure on U.S. allies in Iraq. The meeting today is also likely to be overshadowed by a purported Osama bin Laden tape, aired on Arab satellite networks Thursday, calling for a "truce" with Europe if it pulls its troops out of Islamic nations.
Responses to tape
Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain dismissed the tape as an effort to distance Europe further from the United States; Italy and Britain said they would not flinch from Iraq.
"You know, I don't think we need Osama bin Laden to start telling us how to handle our political affairs," Blair said Thursday in New York.
CIA analysts said the tape was likely an authentic recording of the Al-Qaida chief. Broadcast Thursday on Arab TV stations, it was the first since January attributed to bin Laden, believed to be hiding in mountains along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
The recording was apparently made in recent weeks, the CIA said, because it includes a reference to Israel's killing on March 22 of Hamas founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin.
One analyst said the three-month truce offer might contain a message to militants to hold back on attacks against Europe. Others said the recording marked a subtle shift in strategy by bin Laden, aiming to exploit differences between the United States and Europe over Iraq rather than attacking the West in general.
As Blair and Bush discuss the planned June 30 sovereignty handover, Britain's prime minister is likely to express concern that the U.S. military approach could have grave implications for reconciliation, reconstruction, and sovereignty transfer.
'Misgivings'
"Behind the scenes there are quite a lot of misgivings in the Blair camp about the direction things are going in Iraq," says David Mepham, a former government adviser and head of the international program at the London-based Institute for Public Policy Research, a progressive think-tank. "Publicly they will say there's not a matchstick between us, but privately there are differences."
A robust U.S. response to the Sunni and Shiite uprisings, which has left hundreds dead, has unsettled British military and political chiefs, who fret that it will alienate locals and the international community, both of whom are vital to the success of Iraqi transition.
"The Americans will find it very hard to institute democratic governance in Iraq if they are increasingly seen as the enemy of the Iraqi people, and that's what happens when civilians are killed on the battlefield," says Christopher Langton, who heads the defense analysis department at the London-based Institute for International Strategic Studies. "Once you are seen as the adversary, it becomes harder and harder to persuade people that you are a force for good."
Officially, Downing Street denies major differences between the two allies, insisting that both want to stick to the June 30 timetable and secure greater U.N. involvement.
"We are in agreement with the U.S. about the overall strategy in Iraq," says a Blair spokesman, noting that commanders -- British and American -- must be free to make decisions on the ground as situations arise.
Yet U.S. and British commanders have done this in distinct ways in Iraq. From the early days soon after the war was over, British troops quickly swapped helmets for berets and armored vehicles for foot patrols. True, they had the more tranquil south to deal with, while the Americans grappled with the restive Sunni triangle, but experts say there was more to it than that.
Britain's postcolonial heritage has theoretically equipped it well to dealing with situations like Iraq. A hostile local populace, a power vacuum, economic shambles, inexperienced local law enforcement bodies: British troops have seen it all before in the ruins of empire, and its military forces have long since been drilled in dealing with such situations, says Colonel Langton.
Not trained
The Americans meanwhile "don't train to any great degree in low-intensity operations like peacekeeping and peace enforcement," Langton says. "All those aspects are practiced by the British. ... It is quite fortunate that the British are not actually fighting alongside the Americans because they would find it very difficult to agree" with their tactics.
Historical differences mean that Britain and America view the Iraqi turmoil from different standpoints, argues Daniel Neep, a regional expert. The British feel they have experience in nation-building, while the Americans worry that the British may be making some of the same old mistakes of the past, like misjudging local moods.
"Obviously there are diverging opinions between U.S. and British policymakers, but this is to do with different historical experiences," says Neep, of the Royal United Services Institute. He also noted a feeling within the U.S. camp, revealed by an official in a British newspaper interview, that suggested the British might be using their foothold in southern Iraq to pursue reconciliation with neighboring Iran.
"That's inevitable because the British have better relations with Iranians than the Americans," says Neep, "and because they are more exposed to them in the south." An Iranian delegation arrived in Baghdad Wednesday, to mediate between the Americans and rebel Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in Najaf, reportedly at Britain's suggestion.
Blair scheduled a stop-off in New York en route to Washington to discuss with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan the possibility of enhanced U.N. involvement in Iraq's transition.