Key document on terrorism adds fuel to the 9/11 debate

The release by the White House of the Aug. 6, 2001, Presidential Daily Brief pertaining to Osama bin Laden, the world's No. 1 terrorist, triggered a poignant question from Kristen Breitweiser, whose husband died in the Sept. 11, 2001, World Trade Center attacks: " ... what did we do in the summer of '01, knowing that there was going to be an impending domestic attack by Al-Qaida?"
It's a question that the independent, bipartisan commission investigating the acts of terror on 9/11 by bin Laden's Al-Qaida operatives should seek to answer. The need for clarity on this important issue has arisen because President Bush and members of his inner circle, especially national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, have insisted that the Aug. 6 intelligence briefing was "historical" in that it gave an overview of Al-Qaida's activities and talked in general terms about bin Laden's deep hatred for the United States and his desire to attack the mainland.
But critics of the administration's handling of terrorism threats prior to 9/11 contend that the briefing contained specific warnings, such as Al-Qaida operatives learning to fly jet aircraft, that should have put the White House on alert status.
The commission investigating the attacks should delve into this issue not just because of Rice's insistence last Thursday that there was nothing the administration could have done to prevent 9/11, but because there is an urgent need to change the culture that permeates the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency and the other agencies charged with protecting the homeland.
Sworn testimony
The national security adviser appeared before the 9/11 commission last week and testified publicly under oath. She was adamant in her contention the White House did take seriously the warnings about Al-Qaida and bin Laden, but that there was nothing specific upon which the administration could react.
However, Richard Clarke, former head of counterterrorism in the national security agency, in his sworn testimony, insisted that the Bush administration did not take warnings of possible terrorist attacks seriously.
Given this disagreement over who knew what, when, and how they reacted, the American people have a right to straight answers. Did the Bush administration drop the ball, as Clarke asserts, or was Rice correct in her contention that "no silver bullet" could have prevented the attacks?
Rice's appearance before the 9/11 commission came after weeks of stonewalling by the White House. The president and his advisers cited executive privilege as the reason for Rice's not testifying publicly, but the administration relented after Republicans on the commission joined their Democratic colleagues in calling for such testimony.
The families of victims also let their voices be heard.
The 9/11 commission had sought the full disclosure of the Aug. 6, 2001, brief, and is now asking to see another document on terrorism that was prepared during the Clinton administration.
This week, the commission will delve into what the security agencies, such as the FBI, were doing on the terrorism front prior to the Sept. 11 attacks.
President Bush and Vice President Cheney have agreed to meet with the entire commission, but only in private.
We would have preferred a public hearing, but if a private session is the only way to get Bush and Cheney to address the many questions that remain unanswered, so be it.
In the end, the aim is to determine how Al-Qaida operatives were able to elude law enforcement's radar, whether the White House bears any responsibility, and whether there is any way the United States can be entirely safe from terrorists.