There are no surprises in report on Columbia's loss
The findings of a board investigating the disintegration of the shuttle Columbia make official what even a casual observer could have concluded within days of the disaster. The loss of the shuttle and its crew was not an inevitable event.
The Columbia was not a victim to the almost insurmountable dangers that can be associated with space travel. As we learned during the investigation of the shuttle Challenger in 1986, NASA had long ago concluded that in an enterprise as complex as putting people into space, catastrophic failures were to be expected and could well be beyond the ability of any organization to avoid.
But as we learned then, the destruction of the Challenger was not one of those instances. The failure of the O-rings in the shuttle's booster rockets, especially when temperatures approached freezing, was foreseeable and some individuals specifically warned against launching the shuttle that day. Those warnings were ignored or overruled.
History repeats itself
Amazingly and tragically, very much the same thing happened with the loss of the Columbia 15 years later.
The possibility of damage to the shuttle from insulation sloughing off from the fuel tank was known. That a piece of insulation had come loose during launch was known and it was suspected that the shuttle could have been damaged.
Once again, alarms were raised by engineers. There were suggestions that satellite photos be taken of the shuttle in an attempt to determine if it sustained damage that might endanger the craft and crew. And, once again, suggestions that could have averted disaster were ignored.
This is all very difficult for an outsider to understand. The specialists who ignored warnings about the possible damage to the shuttle and who rejected suggestions that more information be gathered not only endangered the crew, but they endangered the U.S. space program for which they worked.
Even more difficult to understand are those managers at NASA who maintained after the loss of Columbia that even if they had known about the damage to the shuttle's wing, nothing could have been done about it. Had that attitude prevailed in 1970, Apollo 13 and its crew would have never made it back to earth after an explosion in space severely damaged that space craft.
It causes one to wonder what happened to the institutional attitude at NASA between the lunar landing missions and the shuttle program.
Change is mandated
The board's report pulls no punches. Absent fundamental and lasting reform, the board said, "the scene is set for another accident."
The board also implied that the administration and Congress -- the representatives of the American people -- are going to have to decide whether they are committed to adequately funding a space program. Part of the problem at NASA was that it was being required to do more with less, the report said.
There is no doubt that space travel is expensive, but the world we live in would be far different today -- and not for the better -- if it were not for space travel. The benefits derived from space research in the areas of medicine, manufacturing and computer technology are incalculable.
The board made 29 specific recommendations, and NASA administrator Sean O'Keefe has pledged to implement all of them. At the same time, Washington must make a commitment to support NASA.