LABS UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

LABS UNDER THE MICROSCOPE
Los Angeles Times: At a hearing two months after 9/11, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., asked FBI Assistant Director James T. Caruso a simple question: "How many labs handle anthrax in the United States?" Caruso's reply was, "We don't know that at this time." We still don't know.
Universities were supposed to comply with the first provision of the new Bioterrorism Preparedness Act -- notifying federal authorities if they possess Ebola, anthrax or 34 other dangerous biological agents -- on Sept. 10. Many haven't done it. Schools that object should read an editorial in this week's Science, an influential academic magazine, chiding scientists for not taking national security seriously enough: "Those working in sensitive areas must emphasize the positive role of science and technology in addressing human needs and the immorality of their use to cause mass casualties and human suffering."
That doesn't mean scientists should go along with whatever the government wants, in the name of security. Knee-jerk reactions on either side are dangerous.
Oversight
In a ham-handed gesture, President Bush this year proposed to transfer oversight of bioterror research from the Centers for Disease Control and the Department of Health and Human Services, which understand science, to the Department of Homeland Security, which doesn't.
Now the administration is considering expanding the bioterrorism act in clumsy ways. The act already allows the toughest federal scrutiny of universities' visa requests involving students from Libya, Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Cuba, the nations that the U.S. designates as incubators of terrorism. Homeland Security chief Tom Ridge also has asked for tighter checks of students coming from other countries, especially China. Ridge's agency is right to scrutinize certain applicants, since the 9/11 hijackers made such efficient use of student visas. But it should be sensitive to universities' mission, too.
President Bush's science advisor, John Marburger, recently cautioned politicians about restricting science. Few state and federal elected officials, Marburger said, "appreciate the delicate complexity of academic life, or its dependence on openness, its insistence on individual responsibility and its critical need for freedom in its intellectual pursuits." That includes freedom to nurture new scientists like Daniel Tsui, a Nobel laureate at Princeton who won the 1998 prize in chemistry after emigrating from China as a foreign-exchange student.
Other new proposals would create a not-quite-classified "sensitive-information" category for government-owned research. Resident-alien scientists, for instance, wouldn't be allowed to store cell biology diagrams on laptops they could take home, because such equations theoretically could be used to make bioweapons.
As the American Society for Microbiology recently warned, the government could slow the very research that is underway to develop countermeasures to such weapons.
Government and universities have never had an easy coexistence. Less defensive communication on both sides could prevent damaging mistakes.
MONITORING THE COURT
Detroit Free Press: While government can make a case for keeping some things confidential, no government entity should be so secret that it is virtually free of public oversight in the form of Congress. That has been the irresponsible nature of the operation of a 24-year-old secret court within the federal justice system.
Congress created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court back in 1978, primarily to give the Justice Department a top-secret avenue to gain wiretap authority for terrorism and espionage cases. In matters where national security is at risk, investigators would not want to let spies and terrorists know justice is on their trail.
But the secrecy shouldn't be perpetual. Nor should the Surveillance Court be immune from congressional oversight. The Justice Department made that clear after confessing that the FBI had misled the court in more than 75 applications to obtain wiretap authority.
Miscommunications
Congress proved its ability to conduct hearings without compromising intelligence over the past few weeks as it probed miscommunications and gaffes in the weeks leading up to the Sept. 11 terrorism. Now, lawmakers should set up a regular check on the court to make sure neither judges, nor the Justice Department, are abusing its secrecy privileges.
That's especially important in the terrorism fight, which tempts prosecutors to be ever more secret. The Surveillance Court issued a harsh rebuke of Attorney General John Ashcroft for trying to stretch the new latitude afforded his office by the USA Patriot Act. But that came to light only last month, when the Senate Judiciary Committee asked for a copy of the ruling. Ashcroft appealed to the Court of Review, which also meets in secret. It's time to let some sun shine in.